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Abstract. Although federal judges are appointed with life tenure, most state judges are elected for 
short terms. Conventional wisdom holds that appointed judges are superior to elected judges 
because appointed judges are less vulnerable to political pressure. However, there is little 
empirical evidence for this view. Using a dataset of state high court opinions, we construct 
objective measures for three aspects of judicial performance: effort, skill and independence. The 
measures permit a test of the relationship between performance and the four primary methods of 
state high court judge selection: partisan election, non-partisan election, merit plan, and 
appointment. The empirical results do not show appointed judges performing at a higher level 
than their elected counterparts. Appointed judges write higher quality opinions than elected 
judges do, but elected judges write many more opinions, and the evidence suggests that the large 
quantity difference makes up for the small quality difference. In addition, elected judges do not 
appear less independent than appointed judges. The results suggest that elected judges are more 
focused on providing service to the voters (that is, they behave like politicians), whereas 
appointed judges are more focused on their long-term legacy as creators of precedent (that is, they 
behave like professionals). 
                                                 
1 NYU Law School, Duke Law School, and the University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Bill Landes, 
Tom Miles, Un Kyung Park, Richard Posner, Jonathan Wiener, and participants at a workshop at the 
University of Chicago Law School, for comments, and Nathan Richardson for helpful research assistance. 
“If the state has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the state 
brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges”. 
 
Justice O’Connor, concurring in Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 
(2002). 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Justice O’Connor’s backhanded put-down of Minnesota’s elected judiciary 
reflects the conventional wisdom among lawyers and scholars that judges should be 
appointed by elected officials or independent commissions, and should not be elected 
themselves (Geyh 2003; Tarr 2003). The conventional wisdom reflects a deeply rooted 
conviction that voters are too unsophisticated to evaluate judges and candidates for 
judicial office. When judges use campaign contributions to finance simple-minded 
television commercials, conflict of interest is layered on public confusion. However, this 
conviction is hardly self-evident. In a system that uses judicial appointments, nothing 
forces the appointing official to select judges on the basis of their legal ability; cronyism 
is very common. And, as the literature on voting shows, ordinary people use various 
strategies for evaluating candidates whose qualifications they do not fully understand. For 
example, they rely on party endorsements and newspaper editorials, and the give-and-
take of the campaign.2 And when many people participate in a decisionmaking process, 
aggregation of information occurs, which can produce more accurate results than when 
the decision is made by only one person. 
 The relative merits of appointment and electoral systems are an empirical 
question, but what exactly should be tested? Most empirical work on this topic focuses on 
judicial independence, the willingness of a judge to vote against the ideological interests 
of the party of the elected official who appointed her or of the party to which she belongs. 
                                                 
2 Newspaper endorsements of judicial candidates are common. 
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However, independence captures only a part of the judge’s role. Judges are supposed to 
be independent but not to be arbitrary: a judge who votes against her party may still make 
bad decisions. And an independent judge who is lazy will not resolve many cases, or will 
resolve them poorly. The measures of independence that have been used in the literature 
imply that the best judicial system would be one in which Democratic judges voted in 
favor of Republican interests and Republican judges voted in favor of Democratic 
interests. It is as though empirical studies of central banks focused exclusively on 
whether central banks made decisions that contradicted the expressed desires of the 
government, and not on whether their decisions were correct, as a matter of monetary 
policy. Central bank independence is important but a central bank that always decided the 
opposite of what the government sought would not necessarily be a good one. The same 
can be said about judges. 
 To test the conventional wisdom that appointed judges are better than elected 
judges, we use a tripartite definition of judicial quality—productivity, opinion-quality, 
and independence. Productivity refers to the number of opinions a judge writes in a 
particular time period such as a year. The more opinions a judge writes, the more disputes 
she has resolved—and dispute resolution is the chief function of the judge. Opinion-
quality refers to the opinion’s reasoning. Better-reasoned opinions explain to the parties 
why they won or lost, but much more important, they provide guidance to future judges 
who face similar cases, and to people and businesses who want to avoid litigation in the 
first place. And independence refers to the willingness of judges to follow the law rather 
than the interests of political parties. 
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 The independent variable of interest is the selection method for high court judges. 
In 12 states, judges are appointed by governors (or, in few instances, legislatures). At the 
opposite extreme, judges in 9 states run for election—and reelection—as members of 
political parties. In between, there are two systems that combine partisan and non-
partisan elements. In 16 states, merit commissions are used: typically, an independent 
commission provides nominees whom the governor may appoint, while a retention 
election is used at the end of a judge’s term (rather than a competitive election). In 13 
states, non-partisan elections are held: the public votes but judges are not permitted to 
advertise themselves as members of particular political parties. 
 A small empirical literature has investigated the relationship between selection 
systems and judicial characteristics in the states. As noted above, the literature has 
focused on judicial independence and not other attributes of quality (Cann 2007; McLeod 
2007; Shepherd 2007), and suggests that appointed judges are more independent than 
elected judges. Our tests of independence produce more complicated results and does not 
favor either system in a clear way. As for overall quality, again the literature assumes that 
appointed judges are better – albeit, with little attempt to measure quality (Cann 2007).3 
We find that elected judges are more productive. And although appointed judges write 
opinions that are cited more often, the difference is small and outweighed by the 
productivity difference. In other words, in a given time period, the product of opinion 
number and citations-per-opinion is higher for elected judges than for appointed judges. 
                                                 
3 There are a handful of empirical studies that do attempt to construct quality measures so as to evaluate 
judicial performance. These studies use either surveys or measures of the educational qualifications of the 
judges as their dependent variables (Cann 2007; Glick and Emmert 1987; Canon 1972). Surveys may 
reflect the biases of the respondents as we discuss in the text. As for educational and professional 
qualifications, those look to be more appropriate as an independent variable rather than as a measure of 
judging quality. (As we discuss below, there are interesting differences overlooked in the literature: elected 
judges went to worse law schools but have stronger local ties than appointed judges do.) 
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 After discussing our results, we attempt an explanation for why elected judges 
might differ in these ways from appointed judges. We argue that elected judges tend to be 
politicians while appointed judges tend to be professionals. Professionals care about their 
reputation among a national community of like-minded professionals, while politicians 
care about their reputation in the local community of lay voters and politicians. 
Appointed judges thus labor to write opinions that will be admired, while elected judges 
try to satisfy as many litigants as possible by dispensing quick but adequate justice. 
Although our evidence does not prove that elected judges are superior to appointed 
judges, it casts doubt on the conventional wisdom, and broadens the scholarly debate. 
 
2. Theory 
2.1 The Determinants of Judicial Quality 
 Beginning with the legal realists, scholars and even judges themselves have 
speculated about the motives of judges, and whether judges decide cases by applying the 
law in a neutral fashion or in a manner that reflects personal or political views, or both 
(e.g., Cross 2005; Newman 1984). Because American judges have the power to strike 
down laws, the early controversy about judges’ motives led to a debate about the proper 
role of judges in the constitutional system. If judges are ideologically motivated, then 
their power to strike down laws sits uneasily with democratic commitments; if they are 
not, or if their ideological motives are constrained, then judicial review has many 
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attractive properties, including possibly the ability to prevent majorities from exploiting 
minorities or otherwise supporting bad law.4 
 In recent years, this debate has reemerged in the framework of an agency model, 
which treats the judiciary or individual judges as agents, and the public or particular 
elected officials as the principals (e.g., Maskin and Tirole 2004). Agency models warn 
that agents, unless properly selected, monitored, and rewarded, will not act in the 
interests of principals. In the context of the judiciary, political institutions need to be 
designed to ensure that people with preferences similar to that of the public are selected 
to be judges, and that judges be given the right incentives to decide cases according to the 
law. 
 With respect to selection, judges should be impartial and competent, rather than 
partisan, ideological, eccentric, or incompetent. What selection mechanism will ensure 
that good, rather than bad, people are selected to be judges and that they will remain good 
after they become judges? Elections might ensure that people with mainstream views 
become judges, but the electorate may not be able to evaluate a potential judge’s legal 
ability and other technical qualifications, let alone whether she is misleading the 
electorate in terms of her future fidelity to what is best for the populace. Appointments 
might result in competent and politically mainstream judges; however, elected officials 
might prefer to use judgeships as patronage positions. Unhappiness with these two 
extremes has led, in many states, to reliance on commissions, combinations of 
appointments and elections, and other complex mechanisms. 
                                                 
4 The vast literature cannot be described here. Holmes (1988) traces the history of this debate. Bickel 
(1986) is the source of the modern debate in constitutional law. Croley (1995) brings the debate to bear on 
state courts. 
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 With respect to incentives, judges should, in principle, face sanctions if they 
decide cases poorly and rewards if they decide cases well. However, if rewards and 
sanctions are used, someone must apply them, and if that person has political power, 
judges might be afraid to decide cases impartially. The federal system avoids this risk by 
giving judges lifetime tenure on good behavior, but the danger with such a system is that 
it allows judges to decide cases badly or in a partisan fashion, without fear of sanction. 
Most state systems attempt to constrain judges by forcing them to undergo reelection or a 
reappointment process, but the danger is that judges will decide cases in partisan fashion 
so as to avoid a partisan sanction. 
 Some history illustrates the tensions (Hanssen 2004). Legislatures dominated the 
judicial selection and retention process between 1790 and 1847 on account of colonial era 
suspicion of the executive and the judiciary, both of which were arms of the British; 
however, some states retained gubernatorial appointment systems. Corruption among the 
legislatures and the spread of Jacksonian democracy stimulated the growth of electoral 
judiciaries beginning around 1850. Progressive-era distrust of electorates led to adoption 
of nonpartisan judicial elections at the turn of the century, and then the rise of merit 
plans. Merit plans generally created commissions that appointed judges, and used 
retention elections to discipline them. Though ideological currents clearly played a role in 
this history, the changes can easily be put in the agency framework, as Hanssen (2004) 
depicts. Reliance on partisan mechanisms reflected fears about the incentives of 
governors and then legislators to select and reappoint the proper sort of judge; the shift 
toward nonpartisan mechanisms reflected concerns about the ability of the public to 
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evaluate judges.5 Today, most scholars reject electoral systems (e.g., Fordham 
Symposium 2007). 
 The empirical literature on judicial behavior has focused primarily on federal 
judges, and especially on the U.S. Supreme Court (George 1998). One vein of this 
literature establishes that judges’ voting behavior reflects partisan or ideological 
preferences, at least to some extent. Judges who are Republicans or who are supported, at 
time of appointment, by conservative media, tend to vote in an ideologically conservative 
way; a corresponding bias characterizes Democrats (Segal and Spaeth 2002). This work 
confirms that unconstrained judges do not necessarily decide cases impartially and casts 
doubt on the assumption that appointment systems are necessarily best. Another vein in 
the literature shows that structural and institutional features influence and constrain 
judges’ incentives to vote once on the bench. For example, perhaps because of 
whistleblower or group polarization effects, federal judges vote less ideologically when 
the panel is split by party than when it is not (Cross and Tiller 1998, Sunstein et al. 2004). 
 A smaller empirical literature on the state courts has come to similar results. 
Brace and various coauthors find correlations between voting and ideology, analogous to 
the federal court studies (e.g., Brace et al., 2001, Brace et al. 2006). Tabarrok and 
Helland (1999) find that tort awards are higher in electoral states than in non-electoral 
states. They argue that their results reflect the stronger incentives of elected judges to 
redistribute wealth from out-of-state corporations to in-state voters and to please the local 
trial bar (see also Helland and Tabarrok 2002). Hanssen (1999) finds more litigation in 
non-electoral states than in electoral states. He argues that high court judges in non-
                                                 
5 Berkowitz and Clay (2006) find that legislative preferences with respect to judicial independence may be 
connected to the type of legal system (civil or common law) of the nation that originally settled the areas 
that became states. 
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electoral states have more independence, and therefore are under less pressure to decide 
cases consistently. Greater uncertainty about the law generates more litigation. Hanssen 
(2000) finds that state bureaucracies are larger in non-electoral states than in electoral 
states, which he attributes to defensive efforts by the agencies to protect themselves from 
less politically constrained judges. Pinello (1995) finds that appointed judges are more 
likely to favor criminal defendants than elected judges are. Besley and Payne (2006) find 
that employment discrimination claims are more numerous in electoral states than in non-
electoral states, which they argue shows that elected judges are more likely to rule in 
favor of employees than appointed judges are. Berkowitz and Clay (2006) find that the 
quality of state courts, as measured by surveys of senior attorneys at wealthy companies, 
is positively correlated with nonpartisan judicial retention procedures. Shepherd (2007) 
focuses on the political party of “retention agents”—those people who decide whether a 
judge will be retained or not—and finds that judges (of whatever party) are more likely to 
vote in favor of traditional Republican interests when retention agents are Republicans, 
and are more likely to vote in favor of traditional Democratic interests when retention 
agents are Democrats. The effect is larger when the retention process is electoral than 
when it involves reappointment. An early study by Landes and Posner (1980) finds that 
citations (including federal and out-of-state citations) of state supreme court opinions are 
uncorrelated with selection system. 
 The literature, taken as a whole, provides evidence that selection and retention 
institutions influence judicial outcomes—by influencing who becomes a judge, or how 
judges decide cases, or both. The literature also confirms that judges are influenced by 
political factors. The literature largely skirts our topic—whether elected judges are, 
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overall, better or worse than appointed judges—but offers tantalizing hints. The Tabarrok 
and Helland studies imply that elected judges are better agents of their constituents than 
are appointed judges; the social problem they identify is due to the federal structure of the 
country and the overlapping jurisdictions of states. Hanssen’s (1999) finding that 
electoral pressures force state judges to be more consistent implies that elected judges are 
better—more consistent opinions, all else equal, are better than inconsistent opinions. 
Berkowitz and Clay (2006) do use a measure of overall judicial quality based on the 
views of senior attorneys at wealthy companies, but, as they acknowledge (pp. 412–13), 
the views of these senior attorneys are hardly unbiased. Landes and Posner’s (1980) study 
is closest to ours, but they do not look at productivity and independence, and their study 
has several methodological limitations.6 Our results are quite different from theirs. 
 Following the literature, we envision the relationship between the public and the 
judiciary as an agency relationship. The optimal selection mechanism minimizes agency 
costs. Judges expend unobservable effort to decide cases. Agency costs can take two 
forms: laziness (resulting in bad opinions or few opinions) and ideological self-
indulgence (biased opinions). The optimal selection mechanism screens out judges with a 
strong preference for laziness or ideological self-indulgence and/or punishes judges who 
are observably lazy or ideologically self-indulgent. 
 
                                                 
6 We use a larger sample, different variable definitions, and many more control variables. Their study is 
mainly about the federal courts. And their data come from a different era, before the modern concern about 
excessive political competition among state court justices fueled by campaign donations (Carrington 1998). 
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2.1 Judicial Quality and Judicial Selection Mechanisms 
2.1.1 Judicial Quality 
 We use three measures of judicial quality. 
 Productivity. Judges have some discretion over how many opinions they write. 
Judges who write slowly will write fewer opinions. Judges who are lazy and wish to 
avoid writing concurrences and dissents, will also write fewer opinions. We measure a 
judge’s productivity using the total number of opinions she writes during our sample time 
period (1998-2000), including majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. 
 Productivity is a measure of effort, but is also a measure of quality because, all 
else equal, more opinions settle a greater number of legal disputes and resolve more legal 
issues. However, not all else is equal. A judge who writes more opinions might devote 
less time to each opinion, so that quality suffers. So productivity is at best only a partial 
measure of quality. 
 Citations. We assume, consistently with the rapidly expanding literature on 
judicial citations, that citations are a measure of quality (e.g., Baker 2007; Cross and 
Lindquist 2006; Lott 2005; Landes, Lessig and Solimine 1998). Better opinions are cited 
more frequently than worse opinions. An opinion is cited frequently because it resolves a 
legal question or identifies some new legal problem or represents an advance in the law 
or simply clarifies doctrine. We focus on out-of-state citations because this allows us to 
control for the possibility that in-state citations reflect local legal customs or conventions. 
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To check for robustness, we further subdivide citations into federal, state, and law review 
citations.7  
 Independence. Judges have the duty to enforce the law impartially, without regard 
to the legally irrelevant characteristics of the litigants or the goals of political parties. We 
thus assume that better judges are more independent. Some studies (e.g., Shepherd 2007) 
measure independence by the propensity of a judge to vote against interests associated 
with her party—for example, a Republican judge voting in favor of an employee and 
against an employer. This measure of independence focuses exclusively on the vote in the 
case and does not take into account the direction of the opinion’s reasoning. It would, for 
example, code an opinion that decides a particular case against an employee, but creates 
precedent through its reasoning that would assist later employee suits, as Republican. 
And then there is the question of whether coding a vote against an employee and for the 
employer, regardless of the facts of the case, gets at the Republican/Democrat distinction 
at all. To avoid the foregoing pitfalls, we look directly at when judges decide to write 
opinions against judges of the same or opposite party. We posit that a judge who writes 
several dissents against majority opinions authored by judges of the same party (or 
majority opinions against dissents of same party judges) is more independent than a judge 
who rarely dissents and never against a judge of the same party.  
 Our measure of independence is imperfect, and we address its problems and 
alternatives subsequently. For now, we note two problems. First, the measure can be 
distorted by personal animosities. Personal animosities might cause judges to refuse to 
join opinions as often as they otherwise would (Choi and Gulati 2004). Second, there 
                                                 
7 The problems with citations studies have been rehearsed elsewhere and we will not repeat them here (for 
example, on the possibility of bias, see Abramowicz and Tiller 2005; Bhattacharya and Smyth 2004; Choi 
and Gulati 2007). 
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might be judges who are excessively partisan. These excessively partisan judges, because 
they view their co-partisan colleagues as not partisan enough, may end up dissenting a lot 
against the moderate judges from their own party. Such behavior – extremely partisan 
behavior – may then be interpreted as independence. 
 
2.1.2 Selection Mechanisms 
 State judicial selection mechanisms can be divided in several ways. The literature 
has not arrived at a consistent methodology, and our approach differs from those of other 
researchers. Nonetheless, the approaches are roughly consistent, and we test ours for 
robustness. We divide judicial selection mechanisms into four categories (Table 1).  
<<Insert Table 1 About Here>> 
 Governor or Legislative Appointment. In 12 states, judges are appointed by the 
governor or (in South Carolina and Virginia) the legislature. Gubernatorial appointments 
usually require the consent of the upper house of the legislature or the participation of a 
special commission such as an executive council. In most of these states, judges serve a 
term (ranging from 6 to 14 years) and then may be reappointed in the same manner. In 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, judges enjoy lifetime or near-lifetime 
tenure. 
 Merit Plan. In 16 states, judges are nominated by a nonpartisan commission, and 
then appointed by the governor. Judges serve a term and then are subject to a retention 
election, where they run alone, and voters can either approve another term or vote against 
them. Terms vary but on the whole are less than those in appointment states. 
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 Nonpartisan Election. In 13 states, judges run for election. Their political 
affiliations are not listed on the ballot, and so voters, unless specifically informed, do not 
know a candidate’s political party. These judges serve a term and then may run for 
reelection. The terms range from 6 to 10 years. 
 Partisan Election. In 9 states, judges run for election as a member of a political 
party. They serve a term in the range of 6 to 10 years for the most part and then may run 
for reelection.  
 Readers might be skeptical about whether voters care much about judicial 
elections and use the elections as an opportunity to reward good judges and punish bad 
judges. Hall (2001) finds that only 8.3 percent of state supreme court judges seeking 
reelection between 1980–94 were defeated. Hall, nonetheless, reports a great deal of 
variation across time and selection systems. In partisan elections, judges during this 
period were defeated 18.8 percent of the time; in 1994, 36 percent of them were defeated. 
And judges’ electoral success appears to hinge on their ideological similarity to voters. 
“The fact of the matter ... is that supreme court justices face competition that is, by two of 
three measures, equivalent if not higher to that for the U.S House” (Hall 2001, p. 319). 
(For further discussion, see Dudley 1997, Aspin 1999, and Geyh 2003). 
We should note that each state has a unique system; the categorizations suppress a 
great deal of variation. For example, the governor of Massachusetts appoints nominees of 
a judicial selection commission while the governor of Maine makes appointments subject 
to confirmation by the Senate. Massachusetts judges serve until the age of 70; Maine 
judges have seven year terms, at the end of which they may be reappointed by the 
governor, again subject to Senate confirmation. These differences have led to different 
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coding practices in the literature, with some authors focusing on retention (e.g., Shepherd 
2007) and others on selection procedures (e.g., Besley and Payne 2006); some using only 
two categories, others using multiple categories, and so forth. 
 Our categorization is similar to that of the other authors. The main concern is that 
if selection is relatively nonpartisan, and retention is relatively partisan, our selection 
variable will be misleading. Fortunately, it appears that the degree of partisanship tends 
to be the same at selection and retention decisions, and indeed tenure length is negatively 
correlated with the partisanship of the selection process (see Table 5, below). 
 
2.2 Hypothesis 
 Conventional wisdom is that appointed judges are better than elected judges. If so, 
appointed judges should have higher productivity, citation numbers, and independence. 
The existing empirical literature provides some support for the hypothesis that appointed 
judges are more independent. Our analysis adds an analysis of productivity and citation 
numbers in addition to a new measure of independence to get at the underlying question 
of whether appointed judges are of higher quality than elected judges. 
 
3. Data Description 
3.1 The Dataset 
 We examine the decisions of all the judges of the highest court of every state for 
the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. The District of Columbia is excluded because of its 
anomalous position. Two states—Texas and Oklahoma—have two highest courts, one 
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with jurisdiction over civil appeals and the other with jurisdiction over criminal appeals. 
We, in effect, treat these courts as separate state courts: so we have 52 “states.” 
 Each court has a certain number of seats, but we count judges, rather than seats, 
so if turnover occurs, a court will have more judges than seats; and, if some seats are left 
empty, there could be fewer judges than seats. Our dataset contains 408 judges, about 8 
per court. The average judge spent 2.65 of the 3 years in our sample period on the court. 
And each judge wrote on average about 67 opinions per year. 
 We organize the data in three ways. For productivity, we run judge-year level 
regressions. Each observation is a judge for a particular year; there are 1082 
observations—that is, the product of 408 and 2.65. For citations, we run opinion-level 
regressions to allow us to assess the factors that lead to citations to specific majority 
opinions. There are 27,596 majority opinion observations in our dataset. For 
independence, we run judge-level regressions on data pooled from 1998 to 2000, and 
hence there are 408 observations. We assume that a judge’s independence does not 
change over the 1998 to 2000 time period and use pooled data to obtain as large a sample 
as possible of opposing opinions with which to construct our independence measure. In 
many of our regressions, the actual number of observations is lower as a result of 
inadequate data for variables of interest. 
 
3.2 Measures of Judicial Quality 
3.2.1 Productivity 
 Productivity is measured by total number of opinions written for any given year, 
including dissents and concurrences (Total Opinions). Our least productive judge wrote 
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two opinions in one year,8 while our most productive judge wrote 263 opinions in one 
year. The mean was 67 opinions per year. Table 2 provides productivity data, arranged by 
type of selection system. 
<<Insert Table 2 About Here>> 
A pattern is evident. Judges in more partisan systems are more productive than 
judges in less partisan systems. The difference between the mean level of Total Opinions 
for Election Partisan compared with Appointed judges is significant at the <1% level. 
Judges in more partisan systems also write greater numbers of dissents than judges in less 
partisan systems—an issue to which we will return. The difference between the mean 
Dissenting Opinions for Election Partisan compared with Appointed is significant at the 
<1% level. 
 
3.2.2 Opinion Quality 
 
 Our primary quality variable is the number of out-of-state citations to a particular 
opinion by a particular judge (Outside State Citations). We also look at narrower 
measures—such as law review citations and outside federal court citations.  
The best measure of quality is citation by an outside court—including another 
state court or outside federal court. Inside state and home federal court citations are 
driven to large extent by precedent. Looking at only outside citations allows us to 
examine those citations where judges have greater discretion to pick which opinions to 
cite. For the most part, judges are citing these outside opinions because they are helpful, 
not because the opinion has precedential force. Because of this discretion, an outside 
                                                 
8 Probably because the judge left office early in the year, entered office late in the year, was sick during the 
year, or had administrative duties. 
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circuit citation represents a better indication of which opinions judges deem of higher 
quality. Table 3 provides citation data, categorized by selection system. 
<<Insert Table 3 About Here>>  
The citation pattern reported in Table 3 is strong. Appointed and other judges 
subject to less partisan pressures have higher per-opinion outside citation levels than both 
non-partisan and partisan elected judges. The differences in the mean levels of Outside 
State Citations for non-partisan and partisan election judges compared with appointed 
judges are significant at the <1% level. This pattern carries through for law review 
citations as well (where the differences are again significant at the <1% level). 
 
3.2.3 Independence 
 
 Our independence measure focuses on the tendency of judges to write opinions 
that disagree with co-partisans when the pool of judges provides opportunities to do so.9 
We define an “opposing opinion” as either a majority opinion when a dissent exists, or a 
dissent when a majority exists. We assume that a judge exhibits independence when she 
writes an opposing opinion against a co-partisan.  
 We obtain a measure of the political party for each judge in our sample. We 
looked to three sources of information on party membership. First, we searched NEXIS 
and the Internet (using Google) for any news reports on the political affiliation of the 
each judge. Second, we also searched for information on political contributions at the 
opensecrets.org website. We used the political party of the donee candidate as a proxy for 
the political party of judges who contributed. Third, we used the party of the governor (if 
                                                 
9 The variable is defined as follows: indep = (demopratio - opdisratio)*(republican = 1)+ (repopratio – 
opdisratio)*(democrat = 1), where demopratio is the fraction of majority opinions in the state written by a 
Democrat (and similarly for repopratio), and opdisratio is the fraction of opposing opinions written by the 
judge in question against a Democrat. 
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any) who appointed the judge as a proxy for the judge’s political party. In most of the 
cases where we had multiple sources of information on political party, the party was 
consistent across these sources. When our three sources reported different parties, we 
gave first priority to the party identified through our NEXIS and Internet searches and 
second to the party identified in the opensecrets.org database. 
We define Opposite_Party as the number of opposing opinions written, by the 
judge of interest, against a judge of the opposite party divided by the number of opposing 
opinions written against a judge of either party from 1998 to 2000. Thus, this variable 
measures propensity to side with co-partisans. Not all opposing opinions are driven by 
the ideology of the opposing judges. A judge who dissents at random would dissent 70 
percent of the time against an opposite party judge if the background pool of majority 
opinions consisted of 70 percent opposite party authored opinions. To take into account 
the background pool of opinions, we define Opposite Pool as the total number of majority 
opinions authored by an opposite party judge divided by the total number of majority 
opinions authored by either an opposite or same party judge (not including the judge in 
question) from 1998 to 2000.  
 We define Independence as Opposite_Pool minus Opposite_Party. A more 
negative Independence score corresponds to a judge who writes opposing opinions 
against opposite party judges more frequently than the background pool of majority 
opinions authored by opposite party judges. Conversely, a more positive Independence 
score corresponds to an authoring judge who writes opposing opinions less frequently 
against opposite party judges compared with the background pool of opinions (and thus 
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more frequently against co-partisans). We treat a more positive Independence score as 
indicative of a more independent judge.10  
  Table 4 reports summary statistics on our Independence measure. Only judges for 
whom we could identify a political party were included in the analysis, and only judges 
from states that had a mixture of judges from different political parties were included. 
<<Insert Table 4 About Here>>  
 Panel A of Table 4 reports the mean Independence level for judges associated 
with the different selection systems for high court judges. Note that unlike our 
productivity measures discussed above, Independence is based on pooled data from 
1998–2000. We do not expect the Independence of a judge to vary by year, and pooling 
the data enables us to increase the amount of data used to generate the Independence 
measure for any particular judge. From Panel A, note that the mean Independence level 
was negative for judges associated with all four different selection systems. Judges tend 
to write opposing opinions more against opposite party judges relative to the background 
pool of majority opinions 
 Judges subject to partisan election have the highest independence. Judges subject 
to non-partisan election have the lowest independence. However, the differences between 
the mean Independence scores for non-partisan election judges and merit selection and 
appointed judges are not statistically significant. Only the difference between the mean 
                                                 
10 Consider, for example, a Republican judge sitting on a high court in a state where the other judges are 
split 50-50 between Republican and Democrat judges and the pool of majority opinions written by other 
judges corresponds to this 50-50 split. Suppose our Republican judge authors 10 dissents and 20 majority 
opinions where there is a dissenting opinion. And suppose that 5 of the 10 dissents are authored against a 
Democrat judge and 15 of the 20 majority opinions face a dissent from a Democrat judge. In this case, 
Opposite_Party would equal (5+15)/(10+20) = 2/3. Opposite_Pool equals 1/2. Independence would then 
equal 1/2 – 2/3 = – 1/6. Because of the tendency of our Republican judge to write an opposing opinion 
more frequently against Democrats compared with the background pool of majority opinions, the 
Republican judge receives a negative Independence score.  
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Independence score for non-partisan election and partisan election judges is significant 
(at the 10 percent confidence level only), which is a bit puzzling. 
 The bottom line is that the data is consistent with the findings in the empirical 
literature that judicial opinions reflect partisan or ideological bias. However, the data 
does not support the received wisdom that appointed judges are more independent than 
electoral judges. 
 This partial result could reflect problems with our Independence measure. There 
are two main problems. First, consider the extreme case where all judges on a particular 
state high court are all of the same political party (say all Republican). In this case, our 
Independence measure will equal zero since Opposite_Party will equal Opposite_Pool 
(and both will equal zero since there are no Democrat-authored opinions). Our analysis in 
Table 4 excludes judges who come from states with no variation in political party among 
judges for this reason. But, by the same token, we lose data. 
Second, even where all judges are not of the same political party in a state, if an 
imbalance exists, the range of the Independence variable will vary. Consider two 
Republican judges. One is in a state with 90 percent of the majority opinions written by 
Democrats and the other is in a state with 10 percent of the majority opinions written by 
Democrats. For the first, Independence can range from –0.1 to +0.9. For the second, 
Independence can range from –0.9 to +0.1. So the second judge could have a much more 
negative Independence score than the first judge simply because the range is shifted over. 
 To address these problems, we try a number of different approaches. 
 First, we create a version of the Independence variable that is less dependent on 
the background political makeup of a particular state court. Independence_Indicator is 
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defined as 1 if Independence is greater or equal to zero and 0 otherwise. The indicator 
variable addresses the range problem but also throws out information: it suggests judges 
subject to non-partisan elections are less independent than the other types, who are about 
the same. The last column of Panel A of Table 4 reports on the mean of 
Independence_Indicator. None of the differences in mean Independence_Indicator levels 
among the varying selection systems are statistically significant. 
 Second, we consider the possibility that the act of writing a dissenting opinion 
(even against opposite-partisan judges) can be a greater display of independence than 
writing a majority opinion (even against co-partisan dissenters). Judges who write 
dissents display independence in their willingness to write critically of the opinions of 
their colleagues. Thus, we treat dissenting activity as a possible proxy for independence. 
However, as Panel B of Table 4 shows, no significant differences exist in the 
Independence score of active dissenters compared with occasional dissenters for judges 
of any of the four selection systems. 
 Third, we consider the possibility that the different systems might have different 
effects on judges of varying political preferences. The bottom of Panel B shows that 
judges who make political contributions (Open Secrets = 1) tend to be less independent 
for the more partisan selection systems compared with judges who did not make any 
political contributions (Open Secrets = 0). 
 The bottom line is that appointed judges are not, overall, more independent than 
judges in partisan elected systems; they might even be less independent. We do find that, 
among judges who contribute to political campaigns, appointed judges are more 
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independent, but it is not clear that this signifies greater overall independence for the 
appointment system. 
 
4. Multivariate Tests 
 We estimate a number of multivariate regression models to assess the relationship 
of several key independent variables, including the judicial selection mechanism, and our 
measures of judicial quality (used as the dependent variables in our models). We also 
include a number of common control variables in our models.  
 
 
4.1  Selection Mechanisms 
 
 Our main interest is the relationship between the selection mechanism used by 
states to select and retain judges and our dependent variable measures of judicial 
productivity, quality, and independence. Table 1 describes the selection systems for the 
different states. In all the states, the selection mechanism long predates our data pool, and 
thus we need not worry about endogeneity—that states adopted new mechanisms in 
response to changes in judicial quality. Electoral systems can be traced back to the 
Jacksonian era. As we mentioned above, the switch to alternative systems generally 
occurred during the Progressive Era, and the process was more or less complete by the 
1970s. More recent changes, with the exception of South Carolina, have been marginal 
(Hanssen 1999, Besley and Payne 2006, table 1). 
 To check for robustness, we also test the importance of judicial tenure data—the 
average tenure (meaning actual service, not de jure term length) of high court judges by 
state, as of the spring of 1997 (from Hanssen 1999, tble. 1) (Tenure). Note that the 
Tenure data does not come from our data set: we do not have information on the tenure of 
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the judges, many of whom are still in office. We provide summary statistics on the 
relationship between Tenure and the different judge selection mechanisms in Table 5. 
<<Insert Table 5 About Here>> 
 
Note from Table 5 that mean tenure rises as partisanship falls. We have two 
clusters—high partisanship and low tenure, and low partisanship and high tenure. 
The advantage of the Tenure variable is that it allows us to compare the different 
selection mechanisms along a common metric: the length of time that a judge expects to 
remain in office. Only a few appointment states have lifetime tenure, so even the 
relatively apolitical mechanisms permit judges to be “punished”: elected officials or 
commissions unhappy with the performance of judges can refuse to reappoint them or 
support their reappointment. Thus, tenure indicates the vulnerability of the judge to later 
retention decisions more directly than do the selection mechanisms. Judges with longer 
tenure face less retention pressure while judges with shorter tenure face greater retention 
pressure. Tenure allows us to measure the real effects of the retention mechanisms while 
allowing us to rely less on de jure rules that might be evaded in local legal practice.  
 However, problems exist with the Tenure variable. If a judge does a bad job from 
the perspective of the decisionmaker for the retention decision, the judge may be 
sanctioned, in which case she ends up with a short tenure. Judges in equilibrium may 
respond to the threat of a frequent retention decision by catering to the preferences of the 
retention decisionmaker. Thus a judge with a long tenure could represent either a judge 
who rarely faces a retention decision or, alternatively, a judge who does face frequent 
retention decisions but who in equilibrium is adept at satisfying the preferences of the 
retention decisionmaker. The strong correlation between Tenure and state selection 
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systems that provide for longer (if not lifetime) tenure leads us to discount this latter 
possibility. Because of these potential problems with Tenure, we use Tenure only as a 
robustness check of our selection system results. 
 
4.2 Control Variables 
 Our multivariate models of judicial productivity, quality, and independence 
include a common set of control variables. First, we include state level controls that 
attempt to capture differences among states that might account for judicial performance. 
Many of our state level controls relate to the state court system. We include measures for 
the average high court associate justice salary (Adjusted Associate Justice Salary) and the 
average partner salary in the state (Adjusted Partner Salary). The salary variables are 
adjusted for the cost of living for the metro area in which the high court is located in the 
state. Higher-paying states may attract higher-quality judges. Perhaps judges work harder 
if their salary will decline (or not rise much) if they are not retained. We include an 
indicator variable for whether the judges on the high court remained the same throughout 
our sample time period from 1998 to 2000 (Stable Court) and the size of the bench during 
the 1998 to 2000 period (Number of Active Judges on Bench). As a measure of resources 
available to high court judges, we include the average number of clerks per judge for the 
1998 to 2000 period (Number of Clerks Per Judge) and an indicator variable for whether 
the clerks are tenured for at least one year (Long-Term Clerk). Judges may also act 
differently if facing a high workload, particularly if an intermediate appellate level court 
does not exist to help with the workload. We include the log of the number of trial cases 
in the state measured in 1998 (ln(Number of Trial Cases in the State)) and an indicator 
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variable for the presence of an intermediate appellate court (Intermediate Appellate 
Court).11 The variables for the number of clerks and clerk tenure, the size of the bench, 
the number of trial cases, and the existence of an intermediate appellate court may all 
influence a judge’s choice to devote time to any specific case. 
Our state-level controls also include variables relating to the general 
characteristics of each state. Differences in overall state population (ln(Population)), 
gross state product (ln(Gross State Product)), and crime rates (Crime Rate) may lead to 
different mixes of cases and judicial responses to these cases. Because previous research 
suggests that state judges are influenced by judges in neighboring states (Harris 1985), 
and because larger neighboring states might produce different types of cases, we include 
a variable for the aggregate population of border states (ln(Border Population)). We also 
include a measure of the age of the state (State Age). Older states have longer judicial 
traditions and hence possibly a more sophisticated jurisprudence on which modern judges 
can draw. State Age controls for the possibility that modern judges are cited more often 
outside of the state just because they can draw on the older and more sophisticated 
jurisprudence of their particular state. Finally, we include a variable for citizen ideology 
based on election results in each district (from Berry et al. 1998) (Citizen Ideology 
Score). The background ideology of the citizens of a state may affect the preferences of 
high court judges. 
                                                 
11 We also ran the regressions with a control variable for the ratio of cases resulting from mandatory appeal 
to the total number of cases (mandatory and discretionary), to try to control for the possibility that a court’s 
ability to control its docket affects productivity and other dependent variables (Brace and Hall 1990). 
Another possible approach would have been to code for de jure rules governing appeals but these turn out 
to be extremely complicated and we could not determine an objective way to code them. We do not report 
the first regressions because of lack of confidence in the appropriateness of this control variable; in any 
event, it did not affect the statistical significance or (except trivially) the size of the coefficients for our 
main results, with a single small exception: in the independence regressions, the interaction of dissents and 
partisan elected judges loses its statistical significance. 
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 Second, the multivariate models include judge level controls. We include an 
indicator variable for whether the judge was the chief judge of the high court (Chief 
Judge). A judge who is chief judge may have less time to author opinions. The chief 
judge may also command greater respect and receive greater numbers of citations as a 
result for her opinions. Alternatively, the chief may be able to assign herself the more 
important opinions and garner more citations that way (Langer 2003). We include the 
number of years between 1998 and the year in which the judge received her law degree 
(Post Law-School Experience) and the number of years the judge has been on the high 
court (Court Experience). More experienced judges may decide opinions with greater 
skill, leading to more citations. A variable for whether a judge retired in 2001 or earlier 
captures the possibility of end game problems (Retirement Close)—judges who retire 
soon have little to lose from deciding badly.  
 
4.3 Productivity 
 
 Our first multivariate model focuses on judicial productivity. We estimate the 
following equation on judge year-level data using an ordinary least squares regression 
with robust standard errors: 
  
ln(Total_Opinions)i = α + ß1iElection_Non-Partisan + ß2iElection_Partisan  
  + ß3iMerit_Plan + 3ßjiState Controlsji + 3ßkiJudge Controlski  
  + Year Effects + εi 
 
Our model relates the log of the total number of opinions authored by a judge in 
any given year to three indicator variables for Non-Partisan Election, Partisan Election, 
and Merit Plan states. The three indicator variables use Appointed states as the baseline. 
The regression model includes year-level State Controls and Judge Controls described 
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above (see Appendix for definitions). The model also includes year fixed effects. Table 6 
reports results. 
<<Insert Table 6 About Here>> 
 The results in Model 1 of Table 6 contradict the hypothesis that judges subject to 
more partisan pressure are less productive; the opposite is the case. The coefficients on 
Election Non-Partisan, Election Partisan, and Merit Plan are all positive and significant at 
the <1% level. Partisan-elected judges are the most productive, followed by merit-plan 
and non-partisan judges. Appointed judges (the omitted, baseline case) are the least 
productive.  
 Our control variables largely make sense and are interesting in their own right. 
More highly paid judges are more productive, taking into account the opportunity cost of 
forgoing a practicing lawyer’s salary—though the magnitude is small. Judges on a stable 
court are more productive, probably because collegial norms are stronger on stable 
courts. Chief judges are less productive, perhaps because they have administrative duties. 
Judges with more judicial and legal experience are more productive; but judges become 
less productive as they approach retirement. Judges from states with a large population 
are more productive because they have more cases to decide, and, because of the greater 
activity and diversity of the population, more law to make. The presence of an 
intermediate appellate court, the number of trial cases in the state, and crime variables are 
either statistically insignificant or small.12 
                                                 
12 As a robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 of Table 6 using the log of the total number of majority 
opinions in any given year and, alternatively, the log of the total pages written for all opinions in any given 
year as dependent variables. Unreported, we obtain the same qualitative results as in Model 1 in both 
robustness models. Judges from Election Non-Partisan, Election Partisan, and Merit Plan states are more 
productive than Appointed judges (whether measured by total majority opinions or total pages written). We 
also re-estimate Model 1 with the addition of an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the judge was in an 
election year and 0 otherwise (Election Year). Unreported, the re-estimated model provides the same 
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 We replace the three indicator variables for the state judge selection system with 
Tenure, our alternative measure of the pressure facing judges, focusing on the retention 
decision. Model 2 reports that the coefficient on Tenure is negative and significant at the 
<1% level. Judges who face frequent retention decisions (and presumably experience a 
shorter expected tenure), are significantly more productive than judges who have the 
luxury of a longer expected tenure period. These results are consistent with the Model 1 
results. 
 Why are judges subject to electoral pressures more productive? Perhaps 
productivity is used by voters as a signal of judicial competence, or by intermediaries, 
such as newspaper editorialists, bar associations, and parties. Judges who write few 
opinions, then, will be vulnerable in reelection campaigns.13 This would also explain why 
productivity declines as retirement nears (Retirement Close), as reported in both Models 
1 and 2.14 
 If elected judges respond to electoral pressures through increased productivity, 
one might predict that productivity would increase with political competition. To test this 
hypothesis, we use a standard measure in the political science literature. This measure 
takes a higher value when elected officials are more frequently replaced. To Models 1 
                                                                                                                                                 
qualitative results as in Model 1; the coefficient on Election Year is negative (indicating decreased 
productivity) but not statistically significant. 
13 Anecdotal evidence supports the hypothesis that elected judges feel pressure to be productive. 
Productivity is mentioned in newspaper endorsements and judicial evaluation materials from time to time. 
A clear example can be found in the reelection campaign materials of a Texas intermediate appellate court 
judge, which include a table with productivity statistics for a group of judges: 
For the fiscal year ending August 31, 2006, Third Court of Appeals Justice Bob 
Pemberton ranked #1 statewide among Texas’ court of appeals judges in production of 
original appellate opinions on the merits. These results show that Justice Pemberton is the 
most productive appeals judge in Texas for original opinions and the Third Court of 
Appeals is the most productive of Texas’ 14 courts of appeals. 
http://www.bobpemberton.com/2006/09/20/appeals_opinion_productivity/. 
14 We also ran the regressions using total pages written by a judge for a specific year as the dependent 
variable: the results were nearly the same, in most cases with somewhat higher coefficients and higher 
levels of statistical significance. 
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and 2 of Table 6 we add an indicator variable, High Political Competition, for states 
where the level of political competition is greater than the median level. We also add 
interaction terms between High Political Competition and the three indicator variables for 
the state judge selection system (Model 1) and Tenure (Model 2). Table 7 reports our 
results. 
<<Insert Table 7 About Here>> 
   
 Model 1 of Table 7 reports that the coefficient on High Political Competition is 
positive and significant at the <1% level. In contrast, the coefficients on the interaction 
terms between High Political Competition and Election Non-Partisan and Election 
Partisan are negative and significant at the <1% level. Moreover, the sums of High 
Political Competition + Election Non-Partisan x High Political Competition and High 
Political Competition + Election Partisan x High Political Competition are both negative 
and significant at the 5% and <1% levels respectively. While judges from Election Non-
Partisan and Election Partisan states are generally more productive, the amount of 
increased productivity diminishes in states with a large amount of political competition 
(but still remains positive compared with judges from Appointed states).15 Model 2 of 
Table 7, in contrast, reports no significant relationship between the level of productivity 
and High Political Competition interacted with Tenure. These results are puzzling, and 
suggest that the political competition measure is either not accurate or (more likely) does 
not reflect the pressures on judges per se. 
 
                                                 
15 The sums of Election Non-Partisan + High Political Competition + Election Non-Partisan x High 
Political Competition and Election Partisan + High Political Competition + Election Partisan x High 
Political Competition are both positive and significant at the <1% levels. 
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4.4 Citations 
 
 For outside citations, we estimate the following equation for each majority 
opinion using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors: 
 
ln(Outside State Citationsi) = α + ß1iElection_Non-Partisan + ß2iElection_Partisan  
  + ß3iMerit_Plan + ß4iNumber Dissents + ß5iWest Key Pages 
  + ß6iOpinion Length + 3ßjiSubject Matterji  
  + 3ßkiState Controlski + 3ßliJudge Controlsli  
  + Year Effects + εi 
 
The model relates the number of outside state citations (Outside State Citations) 
for any specific majority opinion with three indicator variables for Election Non-Partisan, 
Election Partisan, and Merit Plan states. The three indicator variables use Appointed 
states as the baseline. The model includes the number of dissents written against the 
majority opinion in question (Number of Dissents). A majority opinion with one or more 
dissents may deal with more novel issues of law and generate more citations as a result. 
The model includes the number of west key pages (West Key Pages) as a rough measure 
of the legal importance of the opinion. Similarly the model includes the length of the 
opinion (Opinion Length); longer opinions are more likely to contain analysis that other 
judges may cite compared with shorter opinions, all other things being equal. We also 
include subject matter fixed effects for twelve different subject matter categories, 
including Administrative, Attorney and Client, Capital Punishment, Church and State, 
Commercial, Criminal, Family, First Amendment, Labor, Property, Rights, and Torts. We 
use Other opinions as the baseline subject matter category.  
We include both State Controls and Judge Controls, as described above, in the 
model. For the judge controls, instead of the Retirement Close indicator variable, we 
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include a series of indictor variables for whether retirement occurred prior to 2000 or in 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, or 2005. Because the number of outside citations may drop after 
a judge retires, we use these indicator variables to capture more precisely when a judge 
retires. We also use year fixed effects. Table 8 reports the results from our multivariate 
outside citation model. 
<<Insert Table 8 About Here>> 
 Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges subject to less partisan 
pressure write higher quality—more frequently cited—opinions. Model 1 reports that the 
coefficients on Election Non-Partisan, Election Partisan, and Merit Plan are negative and 
significant at the <1%, 5%, and <1% level respectively. Model 1 is consistent with the 
view that appointed judges write the best opinions. Also, majority opinions with dissents 
are cited more frequently, perhaps because the majority opinion makes new law. This 
reason might also explain why longer opinions are cited more often. Finally, commercial, 
torts, family law, and rights opinions stand out as those that are cited most frequently out 
of state; administrative law and capital punishment decisions are cited the least out of 
state. We do not have an explanation for this pattern. 
Why would appointed judges write better opinions than elected judges? One 
possibility is that the quality of an opinion, unlike the number of opinions written, is not 
observable to the public, so elected judges do not have a strong incentive to write high-
quality opinions. With less pressure to produce, appointed judges might prefer to advance 
their influence and professional reputation by writing good opinions. Another possibility 
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is that a system that selects for judges skilled at electioneering and politicking does not 
also necessarily select for judges skilled at authoring high quality legal opinions.16 
  To test the importance of high levels of in-state political competition, we add to 
Model 1 the High Political Competition variable as well as interaction terms between 
High Political Competition and the three indicator variables for the state judge selection 
system. Model 2 reports that the coefficient on Election Non-Partisan x High Political 
Competition is positive and significant at the <1% level. Greater political competition in-
state correlates with increased quality opinions for Election Non-Partisan judges. This 
result is somewhat puzzling. On the other hand, the sum of Election Non-Partisan + High 
Political Competition + Election Non-Partisan x High Political Competition is not 
significantly different from zero. As well, the interaction term between High Political 
Competition and Election Partisan is not significantly different from zero—indicating 
that judges from Election Partisan states, unlike for Election Non-Partisan states, do not 
respond to increased political competition with higher quality opinions. 
We replace the three indicator variables for the state judge selection system with 
Tenure, our alternative measure of the pressure facing judges, focusing on the retention 
decision. Model 3 reports that the coefficient on Tenure is positive but not significantly 
different from zero. On the other hand, the coefficient on High Political Competition is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Greater levels of political competition correlate 
                                                 
16 As a robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 of Table 8 using the log of one plus the number of law 
review citations to a majority opinion (ln(1+Law Review Citations)) as an alternative measure of opinion 
quality. Not reported, we obtain the same qualitative results as in Model 1. Judges from Election Partisan, 
Election Non-Partisan, and Merit Plan states produce opinions that are cited less by law reviews than 
judges from Appointed states. Moreover, the biggest drop off in the level of law review citations is for 
Election Non-Partisan opinions. We also re-estimate Model 1 with the addition of the Election Year 
indicator variable. Unreported, the re-estimated model provides the same qualitative results as in Model 1; 
the coefficient on Election Year is negative (indicating decreased opinion quality in an election year) but 
not statistically significant. 
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with higher opinion quality. Perhaps because judges in election states where there is more 
political competition do not compete as much based on productivity (but instead compete 
along other dimensions), they have more time to craft higher quality opinions. 
  
 
4.5 Independence 
 
4.5.1 Propensity to Dissent 
 
 To assess what factors correlate with a high propensity to write dissenting 
opinions, we estimate the following equation on judge-year level data using ordinary 
least squares and robust standard errors: 
 
 
ln(1+Number Dissenting Opinions)i = α + ß1iElection_Non-Partisan  
  + ß2iElection_Partisan + ß3iMerit_Plan + 3ßjiState Controlsji  
  + 3ßkiJudge Controlski + Year Effects + εi 
 
 
The regression model relates the number of dissenting opinions written in a given 
year (ln(1+Number Dissenting Opinions)) with three indicator variables for Non-Partisan 
Election, Partisan Election, and Merit Plan states. The indicator variables use Appointed 
states as the baseline. The model includes year-level versions of the state controls and 
judge controls as well as year fixed effects. Table 9 reports the model. 
<<Insert Table 9 About Here>> 
 Model 1 of Table 9 indicates that elected judges, especially partisan-elected 
judges, dissent the most, with merit-plan judges in the middle. Appointed judges write the 
fewest dissenting opinions. If dissenting indicates independence, than elected judges are 
more independent than appointed judges are. 
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 Model 1 of Table 9 also reports, however, that the presence of high political 
competition among elected officials in the state (High Political Competition) reduces the 
propensity to dissent for the judges in elected judge states. Note that the coefficients on 
the interaction terms between High Political Competition and Election Non-Partisan and 
Election Partisan are both negative and significant at the 10% and <1% levels 
respectively. The behavior of judges with respect to writing dissents in Election states is 
not independent of politics. Judges in states with a large amount of political competition, 
for example, may choose not to write as many dissents to avoid providing opponents with 
political targets. Such judges may instead use dissents without opinions to display their 
party loyalty while keeping their political profile low.  By contrast, appointed judges are 
not affected by political competition at a statistically significant level. 
 Model 2 of Table 9 reports the results of our robustness test using Tenure as an 
alternative specification of how judges differ across the states with a focus on the 
retention decision. Note that the coefficient on Tenure in Model 2 is negative and 
significant at the <1% level. Judges who face the possibility of a short tenure (as in 
elected states) write more dissents. Similarly, the coefficient on High Political 
Competition is negative and significant at the <1% level and the coefficient on the 
interaction term between Tenure and High Political Competition is positive and 
significant at the <1% level (indicating that judges who face more frequent retention 
decisions are more affected by High Political Competition to reduce the number of 
dissenting opinions). More political competition in the state might cause judges who 
otherwise would compete based on writing dissenting opinions to focus on other aspects 
of competition. 
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 As a robustness test, we re-estimate Models 1 and 2 of Table 9 with the addition 
of the Election Year indicator variable. Unreported, the re-estimated model provides the 
same qualitative results as in Models 1 and 2; the coefficients on Election Year are 
negative (indicating decreased productivity) but not statistically significant. 
 If dissenting indicates a willingness to express one’s honest view, then our results 
suggest that elected judges are more likely to do this when political competition is low, 
while appointed judges are less deterred from dissenting when political competition is 
high. 17 But overall, elected judges are more willing to dissent than appointed judges are, 
so if dissenting signifies independence, then elected judges are more independent than 
appointed judges are. 
 
4.5.2 Propensity to Write Opinions Against Co-Partisans (Independence) 
 
 Given the shortcomings of focusing solely on the number of dissenting opinions 
as a measure of independence, we turn to our Independence measure. We estimate the 
following equation on pooled data from 1998 to 2000 using an ordinary least squares 
regression model with robust standard errors: 
 
 
Independencei = α + ß1iElection_Non-Partisan + ß2iElection_Partisan  
  + ß3iMerit_Plan + 3ßjiSubject Matterji  
  + 3ßkiState Controlski + 3ßliJudge Controlsli + εi 
 
 
The regression model relates our Independence measure (Independence) based on 
pooled 1998 to 2000 data for each judge with three indicator variables for Non-Partisan 
Election, Partisan Election, and Merit Plan states. The three variables use Appointed 
                                                 
17 We also find a positive correlation between dissent activity and the size of the bench (that is, the number 
of judges participating in cases during our period), which is consistent with Lindquist (2007), who finds the 
same result using federal appellate courts). 
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states as the baseline. The model includes pooled data version of the state controls and 
judge controls as described above. As a control for the subject matter composition of the 
pool of opinions, for each of the 12 subject matter categories (see Appendix for 
definitions) we compute the number of majority opinions that deal with the specific 
subject matter divided by the total number of majority opinions for the state in the 1998 
to 2000 time period. We include this ratio for each subject matter in the model as pooled 
controls for subject matter in the state. Table 10 reports the results of our model. 
<<Insert Table 10 About Here>> 
 Model 1 of Table 10 reports that none of the coefficients on the three indicator 
variables for the state judge selection systems are significantly different from zero. The 
coefficient on Number of Dissenting Opinions is, however, positive and significant at the 
5% level. Those judges who write more dissents are also more independent under our 
Independence measure. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term between 
Number of Dissenting Opinions and Election Partisan is negative and significant at the 
<1% level. While judges who write more dissenting opinions generally receive a higher 
Independence score, this relationship does not hold true for judges in Election Partisan 
states.  
We posit that more ideologically intense judges will tend to act less independently 
when faced with the possibility of an election. To test this, we add the Open Secrets 
measure of political contribution as a proxy for political intensity to Model 1. We also 
add interaction terms between Open Secrets and the three indicator variables for the state 
selection systems. Model 2 reports that the interaction terms between Open Secrets and 
Election Non-Partisan and Election Partisan are both negative (indicating less 
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independence) and significant at the 5% and <1% levels respectively. While more 
intensely political judges do not correlate significantly with a decreased independence 
score for Appointed and Merit Plan judges, we do see a negative relationship between 
political intensity and independence for the elected judges. 
We lastly posit that elected judges from states with a high level of political 
competition will act differently than appointed judges with similarly high levels of 
political competition. We add the High Political Competition indicator variable to Model 
2 as wells as interaction terms between High Political Contribution and the three 
indicator variables for the state judge selection system and report the results in Model 3 
of Table 10. From Model 3 note that the coefficient on the interaction term between 
Partisan Election and High Political Competition is positive and significant at the 5% 
level while the coefficients on all the other High Political Competition variables are 
insignificant. While Partisan Election state judges do display a difference in behavior 
depending on the underlying state political environment (in a way that Appointed and 
Merit Plan judges do not), we are not sure of why the level of Independence increases for 
Partisan Election judges in High Political Competition states. Perhaps elected judges in 
High Political Competition states compete other than through their opinions (and thus act 
less partisan in the decisions themselves).18 
                                                 
18 As a robustness test, we re-estimate Model 3 using Independence_Indicator as the dependent variable, set 
equal to 1 if Independence is greater or equal to 0 and set equal to 0 otherwise. Unreported, we obtain 
qualititatively similar results with some differences. The coefficient on Election Non-Partisan is now 
positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating the judges from Election Non-Partisan states are 
generally more independent under this measure than Appointed judges. On the other hand, the interaction 
terms between Election Non-Partisan and the Number of Dissenting Opinions and Open Secrets remain 
negative (and are significant at the 10% level), indicating that elected judges who write more dissents and 
are politically more active are less independent. Moreover, the coefficients on the High Political 
Competition variables are now all insignificant. 
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 Our results are complicated and difficult to summarize but our overall sense is 
that elected judges are more sensitive to political competition than appointed judges are 
(suggesting that elected judges are less independent) but that elected judges are more 
likely to dissent (suggesting more independence), and that the two types of judges are 
otherwise roughly equally like to write against co-partisans (suggesting equal 
independence). Strongly partisan judges act in a more partisan way in electoral systems 
than in appointment systems, but it is not clear why this matters if independence for 
overall judicial activity is the same. Perhaps the clearest conclusion is that the 
conventional wisdom that appointed judges are more independent than elected judges is a 
simplification and probably an exaggeration. 
  
4.6 Productivity Versus Quality 
Given the ambiguity of our independence results, what’s more important: 
productivity or quality? As a measure of the overall influence of a judge’s opinions, we 
calculated the aggregate number of outside citations to the opinions written by each judge 
in one year (Aggregate Outside Citations). The average judge in a partisan election 
system in one year writes opinions cited (outside of the state and home federal circuit) in 
the aggregate 11.3 times, whereas the average judge in an appointment system writes 
opinions cited in the aggregate 15.0 times (difference significant at the <1% level). The 
numbers for non-partisan election systems and merit selection systems are 11.3 and 14.0, 
respectively. At a summary statistic level, the influence of appointed judges is not 
significantly diminished relative to elected judges despite the lower productivity on the 
part of appointed judges. 
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To provide a multivariate test controlling for state and judge characteristics, we 
re-estimate our judge productivity model (Model 1 of Table 6) on judge-year level data, 
replacing ln(Total Opinions) with ln(Aggregate Outside Citations) as the dependent 
variable. Unreported, the coefficients on Election Partisan, Election Non-Partisan and 
Merit are all positive and significant at <1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using Appointed 
as the base case. Judges from partisan election states in particular correlate with 
significantly higher levels of aggregate outside citations compared with appointed judges. 
In contrast with the summary statistic comparison, the multivariate test is consistent with 
the view that the lack of productivity on the part of appointed judges diminishes the 
overall influence and quality of their total judicial output of opinions. 
We note parenthetically that the quality-quantity tradeoff—that judges apparently 
write more opinions that are of lower quality, or fewer opinions of higher quality—is 
itself of intrinsic interest, and seems highly plausible, yet has not been noticed in the 
literature. 
 
5. Explaining the Results 
We summarize our results in Table 11. 
<<Insert Table 11 About Here>> 
 
Elected judges write more opinions and while their average cite counts per 
opinion are lower than those for appointed judges, they garner more citations overall. 
From the average litigant’s perspective, elected judges provide more justice to more 
people—if one takes the receipt of a written explanation for the court’s decision as a 
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component of justice. Appointed judges write fewer opinions, but those that are written 
tend to be higher quality opinions—they garner more citations. Fewer litigants are 
receiving this high quality justice though. Judges in the different systems exhibit similar 
levels of independence. What explains this? 
 One explanation draws on differences in incentives to write opinions. The 
multitasking model (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), shows that if an agent is given two 
objectives (say, quality and productivity), and the activities that further only one of those 
objectives can be measured and monitored by the principal, then the agent will shirk on 
the hard-to-measure objective and invest in achieving the other. 
 Judges in more partisan systems may write more opinions because raw 
productivity is observable. Judges who write few opinions, for example, can be easily 
criticized and, as we have seen, some judges use productivity as a campaign issue. 
Quality is hard to observe. So, judges who are concerned about retention will shirk on 
quality, while judges with security have no such incentive. Absent political pressure, the 
latter set of judges might concern themselves more with their long-term reputation among 
judicial colleagues and lawyers. 
 As for independence, the propensity to vote with or against co-partisans is also 
hard to observe. If so, elected judges would have no more incentive to refrain from acting 
independently than appointed judges do. So it is, in the end, not surprising that the 
independence levels of elected and appointed judges are not clearly different. 
 A problem with the multitasking theory is our finding that elected judges write 
fewer opinions as political competition increases. Perhaps they need to spend more time 
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campaigning or forging political connections. In any event, they must think that the 
productivity loss does not hurt them, or not much. 
But this problem also suggests that another interpretation of the data might be 
superior. This brings us to selection. It might be that the different systems attract different 
types of people to judgeships: selection matters more than incentives to behave once in 
office. In particular, electoral systems would seem to attract politicians, while 
appointment systems are more likely to attract professionals. Politicians want to satisfy 
the voting public, and this might mean deciding cases expeditiously and in great number. 
Professionals are more concerned about their reputation among other lawyers and judges, 
and are more interested in delivering well-crafted opinions that these others will admire. 
To test this possibility, we compare judges from different selection systems. We 
chose characteristics that might explain the differences in judicial behavior. 
<<Insert Table 12 About Here>> 
 The most striking differences are as follows. Compared with Appointed judges, 
Elected judges make more campaign contributions; are paid less; are on less stable 
benches; have shorter tenures; are more likely to have gone to a law school in the state in 
which they sit; and are more likely to have gone to a lower-rank law school. They are, in 
short, more politically involved, more locally connected, more temporary, and less well-
educated than appointed judges. They are more like politicians and less like 
professionals. Elected judges also have less court experience, but the difference with 
Appointed judges is not statistically significant. 
 One might think that politicians would be more concerned about party 
identification, and hence would be more likely to vote together than professionals are—
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but this is not the case, as our independence measures show. One simple explanation for 
our results is that for most cases, one’s vote has no political salience. The vast majority of 
cases are unanimous. It is more important even for politician-judges to decide many cases 
correctly than to agree with their co-partisans. Political identification matters as a proxy 
for how one’s view affects how one evaluates a case. That is why judges do tend to vote 
with co-partisans. But this general tendency does not produce different independence 
outcomes in electoral and appointment systems because independence for all but a tiny 
number of cases is unobservable (and therefore not a focus of judges under either type of 
selection system). 
 The selection argument is more appealing than the incentives/multitasking 
argument because so much of judicial behavior is hard to observe. Judges may well 
believe that, as long as they avoid extremes of behavior, they can count on being 
reelected or reappointed. Ordinary people elect hard-working locals, while governors 
appoint reliable professionals who will not embarrass them. 
 In sum, a simple explanation for our results is that electoral judgeships attract and 
reward politically savvy people, while appointed judgeships attract more professionally 
able people. However, the politically savvy people might give the public what it wants—
adequate rather than great opinions, issued in greater quantity and therefore (given the 
time constraint) average speed. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 We began this project with the assumption that the data would demonstrate that 
appointed judges are better than elected judges. Our results persuade us that the story is 
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more complicated. It may be that elected judges are, indeed, superior to appointed judges. 
At a minimum, the conventional wisdom needs to be reexamined. 
 A full comparative evaluation of the systems would require more research. In 
particular, there has been much concern in recent years about the rise in the cost of 
election campaigns for supreme court justices, and some evidence that supreme court 
justices are more likely to vote in favor of contributors and their interests (Liptak and 
Roberts 2006, Goldberg et al. 2006).19 However, by the same token campaign 
expenditures enhance public awareness and indicate that judges face real political 
competition, which, for reasons we have given, might be a good rather than bad thing. In 
addition, one needs to take account of the hidden costs of appointment systems, namely, 
that they can serve patronage purposes. 
                                                 
19 Goldberg et al. (2006) identify Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio as outliers—states where 
campaign contributions were much greater than in other states—as of 2000, the last year of our study. We 
checked the independence scores of judges in these states and found Alabama and Michigan had lower 
mean independence scores than the mean for all states, while Illinois and Ohio had higher scores. This is an 
interesting topic for future research, but as of now the data do not seem reliable and accessible enough to 
do a rigorous test. 
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APPENDIX 
Key Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable  Definition 
Total Opinions  Total number of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions 
authored by a particular judge in one year (ranging from 1998 to 
2000) 
   
Outside State Citations  Total number of citations from federal courts outside the circuit that 
includes the state in question and from courts in other states. 
Citations are measured in opinions authored up until January 1, 2007 
(as tracked in the LEXIS Shepard’s database). 
   
Opposite_Party  The total number of opposing opinions written against an opposite 
party judge divided by the total number of opposing opinions written 
against either a judge of the opposite or same party as the judge in 
question for the 1998 to 2000 time period. Opposing opinions include 
dissents written against a majority opinion and majority opinions 
where a dissenting opinion exists.  
   
Opposite_Pool  Total number of majority opinions written by the high court judges of 
the opposite political party (from the perspective of the judge in 
question) divided by the total number of majority opinions written by 
judges of both the same and opposite parties from 1998 to 2000. 
   
Independence  Defined as Opposite_Pool minus Opposite_Party. A more negative 
Independence score occurs when Opposite_Pool < Opposite Party, 
indicating an increased tendency to write an opposing opinion against 
an opposite party judge. Conversely, a more positive Independence 
score indicates a decreased tendency to write an opposing opinion 
against an opposite party judge. 
   
Election Non-Partisan  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state uses a non-partisan election 
to select high court justices and 0 otherwise. 
   
Election Partisan  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state uses a partisan election to 
select high court justices and 0 otherwise. 
   
Merit Plan  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state follows the Missouri Merit 
Plan or a variant (including the Tennessee Plan) to select High Court 
justices and 0 otherwise. 
   
Tenure  The average tenure of high court judges for the state in question, 
measured as of the spring of 1997 (from Hanssen 1999, tble. 1). 
   
Political Competition  Folded Ranney index determined for 1995 to 1998 for the state in 
question (from Bibby and Holbrook 1999). The folded Ranney index 
ranges from 0.5-1, with higher numbers indicating greater 
competitiveness. 
   
High Political Competition  Indicator Variable equal to 1 if the state in question has a Political 
Competition Score that is greater than the median for all states and 0 
otherwise. 
   
 49
Number of Dissents  Indicator Variable equal to 1 if the judge authoring an opinion is 
Republican and 0 otherwise. 
   
West Key Pages  Number of pages in an opinion associated with the West key pages 
section (as provided in the West reporter version of the opinion and 
tabulated on Westlaw). 
   
Opinion Length  Number of pages from the start of the opinion to the end of the 
opinion as provided in the West reporter version of the opinion and 
tabulated on Westlaw. For majority opinions, we measured from 
where the authoring judge’s actual opinion starts to the end of the 
majority opinion. 
   
Open Secrets  Indicator Variable equal to 1 if the judge authoring the opinion in 
question has donated to a political candidate and 0 otherwise. 
Political contributions are tracked by www.opensecrets.org and 
include Federal Election Commission records of receipts from all 
individuals who contribute at least $200 from 1992 to 2006. 
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APPENDIX 
State-Level Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable  Definition 
Adjusted Associate Justice Salary  For year-level data, the associate justice salary reported in the prior 
year for the state (so 1997 for 1998 judge-level data) divided by a 
cost of living adjustment for the year in question measured for the 
metro area in which the high court of the state is located. For pooled 
data, the associate justice salary reported in 1997 divided by the cost 
of living adjustment for 1998. 
   
Adjusted Partner Salary  For year-level data, the average partner salary reported for the year in 
question for the state divided by a cost of living adjustment for the 
year in question measured for the metro area in which the high court 
of the state is located. For pooled data, the average partner salary in 
1998 divided by the cost of living adjustment for 1998. 
   
Stable Court  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state high court justices stayed the 
same from 1998 to 2000 and 0 otherwise. 
   
Number of Active Judges on Bench  Number of judges who were active at any time from 1998 to 2000 for 
the state in question. 
   
Long-Term Clerk  Indicator variable equal to 1 if state clerks are tenured for more than 
one year and 0 if tenure is 1 year or less. 
   
Number of Clerks Per Judge  Average number of clerks per judge in the 1998 to 2000 time period. 
   
Number of Trial Cases in the State  Number of trial cases in the entire state in 1998. 
   
Intermediate Appellate Court  Indicator Variable equal to 1 if the opinion is in opposition to the 
opinion of another judge in the same case and 0 otherwise. In the case 
of a dissenting opinion written by the judge in question, the opinion is 
treated as in active opposition to the majority opinion. In the case of a 
majority opinion by the judge in question, active opposition exists if 
the majority opinion is opposed by a dissenting opinion. 
   
Population  For year level data, the population of the state in millions measured in 
the year prior to the year in question (so the population in 1997 if the 
data year is 1998). For pooled data, the population of the state in 
millions measured for 1997.  
   
Gross State Product  Gross State Product (measured as of 1998). 
   
Crime Index  For year level data, overall crime rate for the state (including property 
and violent crime) per 100,000 population from the FBI Crime 
Report for the year prior to the year in question. For pooled data, the 
overall crime rate measured for 1997.  
   
Total Population in Border States  Total population of all bordering states of the state in question 
(measured as of 1997). 
   
State Age  Age of the state. For year-level data this is defined as the difference 
between the year in question and the year of admission of the state 
into the United States. For pooled data, this is defined as the 
difference between 1998 and the year of admission of the state into 
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the United States. 
   
Citizen Ideology Score  Measure of citizen ideology based on election results in each district, 
which are then used to compute a statewide average (ultimately based 
on interest group ratings of a given state's federal congressional 
delegation) (from Berry et al. 1998). 
   
Misconduct  Number of misconduct removals of judges in the state in question 
from 1990-1997. 
   
Impeached  Number of judicial impeachments in the state in question from 1990-
1997. 
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APPENDIX 
Judge-Level Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable  Definition 
Chief Judge  For year-level data, indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in 
question is the chief judge of the court in the year in question and 0 
otherwise. For pooled data, indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge 
in question is the chief judge of the court for any year from 1998 to 
2000 and 0 otherwise.  
   
Court Experience  For year-level data, the difference between the year in question and 
the year the judge first joined the high court. For pooled data, the 
difference between 1998 and the year the judge first joined he high 
court (if the judge started on the court in 1998 or later court 
experience is set to 0). 
   
Post-Law School Experience  The difference between 1998 and the year the judge graduated law 
school. 
   
Retirement Close  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in question retired from the 
bench in 2001 or earlier and 0 otherwise. 
   
USNews Rank  U.S. News Ranking of the judge’s law school (measured as of 
2005).20  
   
In-state Law School  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge attended a law school 
located in the state in question and 0 otherwise. 
    
 
                                                 
20 These data were convenient; older data was either accessible or less  
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APPENDIX - continued 
Subject Matter Categories 
 
 
Variable  Definition 
Administrative  Review of Agency/Government Decisionmaking (not in 
another subject matter category). Also includes Government 
Actions (e.g., State suit to comply with state statute that does 
not fit in other categories); private actions suing state actors for 
negligence, etc (unless the case involves prisoner rights which 
is included in the “Criminal” category of cases).  
   
Attorney and Client  Attorney Misconduct; Attorney fees (unless fits in one of 
above categories); Disbarment; contempt of court order against 
attorney 
   
Capital Punishment  Capital Punishment-related actions. 
   
Church and State  Pledge of Allegiance; Funding for Private Religious Schools; 
Prayer in School; Ten Commandments 
   
Commercial  Contracts; Insurance; Private arbitration; Creditor v. Debtor; 
Lessor-Lessee; Usury Laws; Franchise v. Franchisor; 
Employment Contractual Disputes; Corporate Law; Piercing 
the Corporate Veil; Tax; Bankruptcy; Enforcement of 
mechanics lien; Implied warrant of merchantability 
   
Criminal  Sentencing Guidelines; Prisoners Rights; Murder; Rape; 
Drugs/Controlled Substances; Attorney-Client Privilege in 
Criminal Context; Grand Jury-related; Juvenile Criminals. 
Excludes Capital Punishment cases. 
   
Family  Divorce; Adoption; Child Support; Probate/Inheritance 
   
First Amendment  Employment issues (excluding employment contractual 
disputes); ERISA; National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA); Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA); Wrongful Discharge; Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA); Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA); Employee Benefits; Worker’s 
Compensation claims; Retaliatory Discharge claims. 
   
Labor  Employment issues (excluding (1) employment contractual 
disputes that are not Workers Comp or state administrative 
wage rate related—these go to “Commercial” and (2) 
excluding discrimination-type claims that fit in “Civil Rights”); 
ERISA; NLRB; Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA); 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); Wrongful Discharge; Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA); Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA); Employee Benefits; Worker's 
Compensation claims; Retaliatory Discharge claims; State 
Wage Rate Claims 
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Property  Takings claims; Zoning issues; Property rights; Property 
Licensing-Related or Permit-Related; Landlord-Tenant-
Related. 
   
Rights  Race Discrimination; Sex Discrimination; Affirmative Action; 
Civil Rights; Age Discrimination; Privacy; Handicap 
Discrimination; Abortion (Includes discrimination in 
employment context cases); Voting Rights-Voting Related 
   
Torts  Federal Tort Related Act; Medical Malpractice; Products 
Liability; Wrongful Death; Libel; etc. 
   
Other  All other cases.  
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Table 1 
 
Appointed Merit Selection Non-Partisan Election Partisan Election 
Connecticut Alaska Georgia Alabama 
Delaware Arizona Idaho Arkansas 
Hawaii Colorado Kentucky Illinois 
Massachusetts Iowa Louisiana Mississippi 
Maine Indiana Michigan North Carolina 
New Hampshire Kansas Minnesota New Mexico 
New Jersey Maryland Montana Pennsylvania 
New York Missouri North Dakota Texas 
Rhode Island Nebraska Nevada West Virginia 
Vermont Oklahoma Ohio  
South Carolina South Dakota Oregon  
Virginia Utah Washington  
 Wyoming Wisconsin  
 California   
 Florida   
 Tennessee   
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Table 2: Productivity 
 
 Number of 
Judge-Years 
Mean 
Total 
Opinions Per 
Year 
Mean 
Majority 
Opinions Per 
Judge Per 
Year 
Mean 
Dissenting 
Opinions Per 
Judge Per 
Year 
Partisan Election 229 31.3 19.4 8.0 
Non-Partisan Election 277 27.5 17.9 6.9 
Merit Selection 336 23.6 18.1 3.7 
Appointed 232 20.9 16.7 3.0 
 
Judge-years represent yearly data for each judge in our sample. Total Opinions includes majority, 
dissenting, and concurring opinions. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Mean Citations Per Majority Opinion 
 
 
Number 
of 
Majority
Opinions 
Outside 
Federal 
Court 
Other 
State 
Court 
US 
Supreme 
Court 
Outside 
State 
Citations 
Law 
Review 
Citations 
Partisan Election 4447 0.108 0.458 0.005 0.572 1.765 
Non-Partisan Election 4952 0.103 0.603 0.007 0.712 1.856 
Merit Selection 6079 0.134 0.631 0.009 0.774 1.840 
Appointed 4007 0.211 0.657 0.006 0.872 2.273 
 
Home Federal Court includes all citations from a federal district or circuit court located in the circuit that 
contains the state in question. Outside Federal Court includes all citations from a federal district or circuit 
court located in a circuit that does not contain the state in question. Other State Court includes all citations 
from state courts outside of the state in question. US Supreme Court includes all citations from the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Outside Citation is the sum of Outside Federal Court + Other State Court + US Supreme 
Court. All citations are from the LEXIS Shepard’s database and are tracked up until January 1, 2007. Law 
Review Citations are for law reviews as tracked by the LEXIS Shepard’s database (until January 1, 2007).  
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Table 4: Independence 
 
Panel A 
 Number of Judges Mean Independence 
Independence_ 
Indicator 
(1=Independent; 
0=Partisan) 
Partisan Election 83 –0.019 0.453 
Non-Partisan Election 89 –0.066 0.345 
Merit Selection 108 –0.030 0.433 
Appointed 72 –0.027 0.435 
 
Independence is defined as the Opposite_Party – Opposite_Pool. Opposite_Party is the number of opposing 
opinions written against a judge of the opposite party divided by the number of opposing opinions written 
against a judge of either the opposite or same party from 1998 to 2000. Opposite Pool is the total number of 
majority opinions authored by an opposite party judge divided by the total number of majority opinions 
authored by either an opposite or same party judge from 1998 to 2000. Independence_Indicator is defined 
as 1 if Independence is greater or equal to zero and 0 otherwise. Only judges for whom we could identify a 
political party were included in the analysis. Only judges from states that had a mixture of judges from 
different political parties were included. 
 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Less than or Equal 
to Median Number 
of Authored Dissents 
Greater than 
Median Number of 
Authored Dissents 
p-value 
Partisan Election –0.021 –0.018 0.9063 
Non-Partisan Election –0.082 –0.055 0.5911 
Merit Selection –0.033 –0.025 0.7801 
Appointed –0.029 –0.023 0.9387 
    
 Open Secrets=0 Open Secrets=1 p-value 
Partisan Election 0.057 –0.052 0.0001 
Non-Partisan Election –0.032 –0.115 0.0893 
Merit Selection –0.028 –0.037 0.7817 
Appointed –0.044 0.067 0.1768 
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Table 5: Tenure Data 
 
 Number of States Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Partisan Election 10 6.8 2.4 3.5 11.1 
Non–Partisan Election 13 7.0 1.5 4.6 9.1 
Merit Selection 17 10.0 4.5 4 19.1 
Appointed 12 9.2 3.1 5 14.9 
Total 52 8.5 3.4 3.5 19.1 
 
Tenure is defined as the average tenure of high court judges for the state in question, measured as of the 
spring of 1997 (from Hanssen 1999, tble. 1). 
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Table 6: Productivity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable ln(Total Opinions) 
ln(Total 
Opinions) 
Independent Variables   
Election Partisan 0.556**  
 (6.290)  
Election Non-Partisan 0.478**  
 (5.700)  
Merit Plan 0.426**  
 (5.050)  
Tenure  –0.045** 
  (–5.870) 
Chief Judge –0.173** –0.190** 
 (–2.800) (–3.030) 
Court Experience 0.011* 0.014** 
 (2.440) (2.950) 
Post-Law School Experience 0.007* 0.008* 
 (2.250) (2.430) 
Retirement Close –0.234** –0.252** 
 (–4.230) (–4.560) 
Adjusted Associate Justice Salary 0.001** 0.001** 
 (3.100) (4.750) 
Adjusted Partner Salary 0.000 0.000 
 (–0.910) (–0.920) 
Stable Court 0.264** 0.303** 
 (4.120) (4.780) 
Number of Active Judges on Bench 0.000 0.045 
 (0.010) (2.530) 
Long-Term Clerk –0.134** –0.029 
 (–2.610) (–0.580) 
Number of Clerks Per Judge  –0.019 0.000 
 (–0.430) (0.010) 
ln(Number of Trial Cases in the State) 0.010 –0.002 
 (0.250) (–0.060) 
Intermediate Appellate Court 0.075 0.097 
 (0.660) (0.880) 
ln(State Population) 0.835** 1.051** 
 (4.420) (5.870) 
ln(Total Population in Border States) –0.057** –0.046** 
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 (–5.080) (–4.200) 
Crime Index 0.000** 0.000** 
 (–5.050) (–6.050) 
State Age 0.005** 0.002** 
 (5.560) (3.170) 
ln(Gross State Product) –0.941** –1.155** 
 (–5.490) (–7.070) 
Citizen Ideology Score 0.002 –0.003 
 (1.060) (–1.150) 
Constant 12.249** 15.025** 
 (6.910) (8.810) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
N 1002 1002 
R2 0.2004 0.2019 
The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. 
+ Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less. 
* Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less. 
** Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level. 
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Table 7: Productivity and Political Competition 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable ln(Total Opinions) 
ln(Total 
Opinions) 
Independent Variables   
Election Partisan 0.958**  
 (7.410)  
Election Non-Partisan 0.739**  
 (6.100)  
Merit Plan 0.533**  
 (4.280)  
Tenure  –0.031* 
  (–1.990) 
High Political Competition 0.299** 0.097 
 (2.750) (0.540) 
Election Partisan –0.743**  
x High Political Competition (–4.490)  
Election Non-Partisan –0.554**  
x High Political Competition (–3.570)  
Merit Plan –0.169  
x High Political Competition (–1.310)  
Tenure   –0.016 
x High Political Competition  (–0.870) 
Constant 11.970** 15.831** 
 (6.200) (8.340) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Judge Controls Yes Yes 
State Controls Yes Yes 
N 979 979 
R2 0.2301 0.2055 
The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. 
+ Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less. 
* Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less. 
** Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level. 
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Table 8: Citations 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Variable ln(Outside  State Citations) 
ln(Outside  
State Citations) 
ln(Outside  
State Citations) 
Independent Variables    
Election Partisan –0.061** –0.061*  
 (–3.070) (–2.260)  
Election Non-Partisan –0.047* –0.089**  
 (–2.580) (–3.690)  
Merit Plan –0.081** –0.109**  
 (–4.100) (–4.140)  
Tenure   0.004 
   (1.140) 
High Political Competition  –0.016 0.084* 
  (–0.770) (2.300) 
Election Partisan  –0.008  
x High Political Comp.  (–0.260)  
Election Non-Partisan  0.131**  
x High Political Comp.  (4.030)  
Merit Plan  0.051*  
x High Political Comp.  (2.010)  
Tenure    –0.006 
x High Political Comp.   (–1.420) 
Number of Dissents 0.060** 0.060** 0.062** 
 (6.840) (6.710) (7.020) 
West Key Pages 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.450) (0.180) (0.380) 
Opinion Length 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 
 (20.320) (20.020) (20.190) 
Administrative –0.077** –0.075** –0.077** 
 (–3.000) (–2.870) (–2.940) 
Attorney and Client 0.057+ 0.049 0.051+ 
 (1.860) (1.560) (1.650) 
Capital Punishment –0.112** –0.116** –0.115** 
 (–3.400) (–3.530) (–3.500) 
Church and State 0.183 0.175 0.179 
 (0.760) (0.720) (0.720) 
Commercial  0.160** 0.159** 0.160** 
 (6.330) (6.230) (6.250) 
Criminal 0.034 0.026 0.028 
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 (1.470) (1.100) (1.170) 
Family 0.077** 0.070** 0.070** 
 (2.920) (2.610) (2.600) 
First Amendment 0.126 0.152+ 0.162+ 
 (1.570) (1.780) (1.920) 
Labor –0.053* –0.055* –0.053* 
 (–2.110) (–2.160) (–2.080) 
Property –0.005 –0.006 –0.002 
 (–0.180) (–0.210) (–0.090) 
Rights 0.110** 0.093* 0.106* 
 (2.650) (2.180) (2.510) 
Torts 0.145** 0.147** 0.148** 
 (5.660) (5.670) (5.670) 
Constant –3.031** –2.578** –3.067** 
 (–8.530) (–6.520) (–8.190) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Court Controls Yes Yes Yes 
State Controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 18360 17726 17726 
R2 0.1309 0.1342 0.1322 
The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. 
+ Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less. 
* Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less. 
** Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level. 
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Table 9: Dissents 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable ln(1+Dissent Opinions) 
ln(1+Dissent 
Opinions) 
Independent Variables   
Election Partisan 0.948**  
 (6.190)  
Election Non-Partisan 0.759**  
 (5.520)  
Merit Plan 0.005  
 (0.040)  
Tenure  –0.113** 
  (–5.960) 
High Political Competition –0.041 –0.959** 
 (–0.310) (–4.220) 
Election Partisan –0.599**  
x High Political Competition (–2.680)  
Election Non-Partisan –0.410+  
x High Political Competition (–1.950)  
Merit Plan 0.423*  
x High Political Competition (2.520)  
Tenure   0.087** 
x High Political Competition  (3.670) 
Constant 3.402 4.407+ 
 (1.430) (1.770) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Court Controls Yes Yes 
State Controls Yes Yes 
N 979 979 
R2 0.2500 0.2070 
The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. 
+ Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less. 
* Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less. 
** Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level. 
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Table 10: Independence 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Variable Independence Independence Independence 
Independent Variables    
Election Partisan 0.052 0.108 0.074 
 (0.810) (1.630) (0.900) 
Election Non-Partisan –0.068 –0.019 –0.114 
 (–1.100) (–0.310) (–1.350) 
Merit Plan –0.053 –0.034 –0.007 
 (–0.780) (–0.490) (–0.080) 
Number of Dissenting Opinions 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 (2.300) (2.320) (2.350) 
Number of Dissenting Opinions –0.006** –0.005** –0.005** 
x Election Partisan (–3.310) (–2.790) (–2.640) 
Number of Dissenting Opinions 0.001 0.002 0.002 
x Election Non-Partisan (0.470) (1.000) (0.950) 
Number of Dissenting Opinions –0.003 –0.002 –0.003 
x Merit Plan (–0.920) (–0.770) (–0.930) 
Opensecrets  0.095 0.091 
  (1.450) (1.310) 
Opensecrets  –0.198** –0.197* 
x Election Partisan  (–2.700) (–2.580) 
Opensecrets  –0.194* –0.171* 
x Election Non-Partisan  (–2.370) (–2.020) 
Opensecrets  –0.120 –0.111 
x Merit Plan  (–1.580) (–1.240) 
High Political Comp.   –0.007 
   (–0.090) 
Election Partisan   0.046 
x High Political Comp.   (0.370) 
Election Non-Partisan   0.225* 
x High Political Comp.   (2.000) 
Merit Plan   –0.016 
x High Political Comp.   (–0.140) 
Constant 2.894+ 1.862 5.185* 
 (1.890) (1.220) (2.420) 
Subject Matter Controls Yes Yes Yes 
State Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Judge Controls Yes Yes Yes 
N 327 327 318 
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R2 0.2037 0.2336 0.2584 
The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. 
+ Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less. 
* Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less. 
** Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level. 
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Table 11: Selection Mechanisms and Quality 
 
Selection Mechanism Tenure Productivity Independence  Quality 
Election Partisan Lower High Unclear Low 
Election Non-Partisan Lower Middle Unclear Middle 
Merit Plan Higher Middle Unclear Middle 
Appointed Higher Low Unclear High 
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Table 12 
 
 Mean 
Open secrets 
Mean 
Salary 
Difference 
(Partner – 
Associate 
Justice 
Salary) 
Mean 
Stable court 
Mean 
Court 
Experience 
Mean 
Post-Law 
School 
Experience 
Election Partisan 0.67a 1004a 0.08a 5.77 29.36b 
Election Non-Partisan 0.36 872 0.28 6.67 30.72 
Merit Plan 0.22 972 0.19 8.47 32.03 
Appointed 0.14 822 0.25 7.28 32.27 
 
 Mean 
Retirement 
Close 
Mean 
Tenure 
Mean 
In-State Law 
School 
Mean 
Active Judges 
Mean 
US News 
Rank 
Election Partisan 0.42c 7.10a 0.70a 9.55a 62.94a 
Election Non-Partisan 0.22 7.09 0.67 8.25 58.78 
Merit Plan 0.23 10.13 0.70 7.65 61.40 
Appointed 0.30 9.58 0.33 7.71 32.34 
at-test of difference in means for Election Partisan and Appointed Judge is significant at the <1% level.  
bt-test of difference in means for Election Partisan and Appointed Judge is significant at the 5% level. 
ct-test of difference in means for Election Partisan and Appointed Judge is significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor Eric A. Posner 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 eric_posner@law.uchicago.edu 
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